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This paper studies cartels' strategic behavior in delaying leniency applications, a take-up decision
that has been ignored in the previous literature. Using European Commission decisions issued over
a 16-year span, we show, contrary to common beliefs and the existing literature, that conspirators
often apply for leniency long after a cartel collapses. We estimate hazard and probit models to study
the determinants of leniency-application delays. Statistical tests nd that delays are symmetrically
aected by antitrust policies and macroeconomic uctuations. Our results shed light on the design of
enforcement programs against cartels and other forms of conspiracy. Journal of Economic Literature
Classication Numbers: D43, K21, K42, L13.
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1. Introduction
A leniency program grants cartel members who by their co-operation contribute to uncov-
ering an illegal cartel immunity from or a reduction of government penalties. Such programs
have become increasingly popular in many jurisdictions around the world (OECD 2002, 2003;
Harrington 2011). Leniency programs are frequently described, by economists (e.g., Harrington
2008, 2011; Chang and Harrington 2010),1 antitrust authorities (Hammond 2001, 2004, 2010;
Suurnakki and Tierno Centella 2007; Kloub 2009) and legal practitioners (Baker & McKenzie
2010; Willis 2011), as a \race": Cartel members rush to confess in order to beat their fellow
conspirators to the enforcer's door. If the \race" were as close-run as theory and anecdote
Support from the German Research Foundation through SFB TR 15 is gratefully acknowledged. We bene-
ted from discussion with Jaap Abbring, Jan Boone, Eric van Damme and Joseph Harrington on this project.
Any mistakes are our own.
ySend correspondence to: Jun Zhou; Email: okonom.bonn@gmail.com
1For instance, in Harrington (2008), when the probability that a competition authority discovers and suc-
cessfully prosecutes a cartel is suciently high, cartel collapses and all rms race for leniency. Harrington refers
to this as the \Race-to-the-Courthouse" eect.
1
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appear to suggest, one might be tempted to conclude, based on the fact that detection was
infrequent prior to leniency introduction (Miller 2009; Hammond 2004), that leniency created
distrust among conspirators, freed up investigatory resources that would be otherwise spent
identifying the reported cartel (Kaplow and Shavell 1994; Buccirossi and Spagnolo 2005), and
enhanced the authorities' detection capabilities. This paper explores the dynamic nature of
leniency application. The main objectives are to document empirically that delayed applica-
tions are a relevant phenomenon, to understand the cause of delays, and to evaluate leniency
programs' eectiveness in inducing whistle-blowing. The results have implications for market
eciency and enforcement eorts against cartels and other forms of organized crime.
One common feature of the game theoretical literature in this area has been the restrictive
assumption that conspirators apply for leniency, once they decide to do so, as soon as a cartel
collapses. The validity of this assumption will be tested here. The assumption might be
unsatisfactory because rst, it precludes an analysis of the pattern of leniency application over
time and does not provide a framework for analyzing policies concerned with delays; second,
application delays are empirically important: Over three quarters of the European Commission
(hereafter \EC") leniency applications by rst-in applicants took place not before but after a
cartel collapses; Nearly 40 percent of the applications by rst-in applicants postdated cartel
dissolution by at least a year; More than half of the applications by rst-in applicants arrived
after the \dawn raids", by which time the EC was already aware of the cartels' existence.2
This salient empirical regularity suggests that standard computations of both the conspirators'
incentive to denounce a cartel and the cartel-destabilizing eect provided by leniency may be
biased.
This paper provides the rst independent empirical analysis of leniency application delays,
from the date that a cartel collapses, to the time that the rst applicant reports the cartel,
and up to the closure of an antitrust investigation. Much of our extant knowledge regarding
the timing of leniency application comes from antitrust ocials, who consistently laud the
incentives that leniency programs create for conspirators to rapidly disclose hidden cartels:
The catch is that [immunity] is only available to the rst one in the door ... the second rm
and all of its culpable executives will be subject to full prosecution. This \winner-take-all"
approach sets up a race ... (Scott D. Hammond 2001; US Department of Justice).
2A dawn raid is the rst stage of an EC investigation where the EC's launches a surprise inspection at a
company premise to recover evidence about possible infringements before the company destroys it.
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The rewards for self-reporting are too great, the consequences of getting caught too se-
vere. The dynamic literally creates a race to be the rst to the enforcer's oce (Scott D.
Hammond 2004; US Department of Justice).
The fact that the greatest protection, immunity from sanctions, is granted only to the rst
cartel member to report, induces strategic behavior ... hence creating conditions for a \race
to the door" of a competition authority (Jindrich Kloub 2011; EC DG Competition).
The race-to-the prosecutor's-door mentality ... has successfully fueled leniency programs
around the world (Ann O'Brien 2008; US Department of Justice).3
There are at least three reasons to view these statements with caution, although the latest
empirical evidence seems to suggest that leniency programs in the U.S. and the E.U. may have
the intended eects (Miller 2009; Zhou 2012a). First, to qualify for amnesty, rms need not
report a cartel immediately upon leaving it. By holding o reporting when the other rms
are currently doing so, a rm remains eligible but avoids attracting attention from antitrust
authorities. Once the opportunity matures, the dead cartel can be evoked without increased
antitrust surveillance; Second, because leniency is more powerful when rms fear that their
accomplice will apply (Harrington 2011), antitrust authorities may have an incentive to cultivate
tensions and distrust among the rms. Overstating the pace of whistle-blowing may be a way
to achieve such an eect; Third, antitrust authorities in most of the jurisdictions (e.g., the U.S.
Department of Justice (hereafter \DOJ")) keep strict condentiality regarding the details of
leniency applications (including among others, their dates). Although it is possible to draw
inferences in some cases, more commonly the details (or even existence) of a leniency applicant
is unknowable from publicly available data (Spratling 1999; Miller 2009). The potentially
perverse incentives in combination with a lack of institutional transparency in most of the
jurisdictions make a study such as ours particularly valuable.
We present evidence that leniency application delays are empirically relevant using a time
series of EC cartel decisions issued between October 1996 and March 2012. The time series
provides data on the dates of cartel dissolution and leniency application which allow us to form
3Hammond is the deputy assistant attorney general of the US Department of Justice and was director of
criminal enforcement in 2000 and 2001. Kloub is a case handler in the cartel division of the EC DG Competition.
O'Brien is senior counsel to the deputy assistant attorney general for criminal enforcement of the US Department
of Justice.
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a relatively precise measure of application delays. We highlight the dierences in delays across
dierent leniency regimes.
Reduced form, semiparametric hazard models and probit models are used and compared to
alternative approaches. The models test how changes in antitrust policies and macroeconomic
conditions aect the length of leniency application delays. We are able to control for the
manpower of EC Directorate-General for Competition, ne reductions, cartel duration and
other factors that may inuence applications. We nd that the EC's new leniency expedites
amnesty applications; and delays are shorter during recessions.
A full analysis of the problem of delayed leniency application would model jointly the cartel
dissolution and the application decision. Such a model is beyond the scope of the current eort.
The process of cartel dissolution is not uninteresting, but it is explored in detail elsewhere.4
Our results may have important policy implications. Cartels impede market eciency and
harm consumer welfare. Although most jurisdictions around the world treat hardcore cartels
as \[t]he most serious ... violations of competition law" (OECD 2002b), the data analyzed here
indicate that the EC discovered hardcore cartels in more than 50 distinct industries across four
continents over the sample period. Our results suggest that standard computations of both a
conspirator's incentive to apply for leniency and the destabilizing and deterrent eects provided
by the leniency programs may be biased. Assuming that conspirators report a cartel as soon
as the cartel ends overstates leniency's ecacy in enhancing detection and saving enforcement
resources, as more than half of the applications by rst-in applicants postdated the dawn raids.
Moreover, we are not aware of any in-depth empirical analysis of this delay behavior.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we provide relevant institutional background
on the leniency programs. We highlight the fact that leaving a cartel provides only a necessary,
but not a sucient, condition for applying for leniency. We briey review the leniency program
literature, emphasizing areas where realistic consideration of leniency-application behavior can
aect analysis. Section 3 presents evidence that leniency application delays are empirically
relevant. We use data from the EC to show that delays are frequent and, in many instances,
long. Section 4 investigates determinants of application delays. We present both hazard and
probit models of delays. Section 5 provides robustness checks to our main results. Section 6
concludes by summarizing our ndings and discussing policy implications.
4Zhou (2012a) describes the probability of cartel dissolution and its determinants in 126 discovered cartels
from the EC for the period December 1985 to December 2011.
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2. Background
2.1. Institutional features
Understanding the motivation for our analysis requires a brief overview of how ne reductions
are determined in a leniency program. In 1996, the EC introduced a leniency program, with
the intent of detecting existing cartels and deterring new cartels. It provided discretionary ne
reductions to rst-in applicants, provided that an investigation into the applicant's cartel is
not already underway. It precluded ringleaders| instigators or rms that had played a key
role in a cartel| from applying for complete amnesty (i.e., 100 percent ne reduction). In
2002, the EC introduced a new leniency program. The program commits the EC to the lenient
prosecution of early applicants. Since that date, complete amnesty has become guaranteed
and automatic to rst-in applicants, and the door of complete amnesty applications has been
opened to ringleaders, provided that they did not coerce other rms to participate in the
cartel. Both the 1996 and the 2002 leniency requires an eligible applicant to, upon reporting a
cartel, promptly terminate its involvement in the cartel and fully cooperate with Commission
investigation.
An important feature shared by the programs above is that cartel dissolution need not be
concurrent with application: After a cartel collapses, a conspirator remains eligible to apply
for complete amnesty until the cartel is unveiled in the event of a report by an accomplice
or an independent Commission investigation. As we document below, throughout the period
1996 to 2012 there have been many cases where applicants obtained complete amnesty with
applications postdating cartel dissolution by some months or even years.
A second important common feature of the programs is that they oer partial (i.e., less than
100 percent ne reduction) but discretionary amnesty to the second and subsequent applicants.
Provided that the information reported is suciently novel, a late conspirator may apply for
and obtain ne reductions throughout the investigation, from the date an initial inspection
starts, to the time that a formal proceeding is initiated (i.e., the sending of the Statement of
Objections), and up to the EC's nal decision. As we report below, late applicants obtained
generous ne reductions in many cases throughout the period 1996 to 2012.
The above two features are shared, in similar ways, by the contemporary leniency programs
in Australia, Canada, China, France, Germany, Italy, Japan and South Korea. Although
leniency programs in some jurisdictions (e.g., the United States, Israel and Brazil) preclude
late applicants, ne reductions are available and have been provided through, for instance,
plea-bargaining or settlement that are accomplished pursuant to a distinct procedure that falls
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outside of a leniency program (ICN 2008; O'Brien 2008; OCED 2012).
2.2. Previous literature
A large and growing game-theoretical literature, starting from Motta and Polo (2003) and
reviewed in Rey (2003) and Spagnolo (2008), has studied the impact of leniency on cartel
stability by examining conspirators' incentive to unveil a cartel. The primary force in the
analyses has been that leniency may destabilize cartels because conspirators can simultaneously
cheat on a cartel and disclose it for reduced penalty (e.g., Motta and Polo 2003, Spagnolo 2004,
Chen and Harrington 2007, Harrington 2008). For instance, in Harrington (2008), when the
detection probabilities (absent a conspirator's cooperation) is suciently high, cartels collapse
immediately and all conspirators race for leniency. When the probability is suciently low,
cartels are stable and conspirators never confess. Firms' incentive to report also may depend
on market concentration (Ellis and Wilson 2003), the degree of rm heterogeneity (Motchenkova
and van der Laan 2005), and the relationship between penalties and cartel prots (Motchenkova
2004).
This literature, however, suers from a potential weakness that has thus far been ignored:
the endogeneity in the timing of leniency application and, therefore, a conspirator's incentive to
report a cartel. Our results| where delays in leniency applications are frequent and long| run
contrary to the prediction of all previous theoretical models which is that conspirators either
confess immediately after a cartel collapses or never confess.
Our empirical results most closely relate to those of Brenner (2005), Miller (2009) and Zhou
(2012a). Brenner found limited evidence that the EC's 1996 leniency destabilized cartels. As
discussed earlier, the EC did not promise full immunity to rst-in applicants until 2002. Inde-
pendently, Miller and Zhou test the ecacy of the new leniency programs in the United States
and the European Union. They found that the new programs, with guaranteed and automatic
full immunity for rst-in applicants, enhanced the antitrust authorities' cartel-destabilization
capabilities. Although these studies ignore the timing of leniency applications, their results are
consistent with those presented here because they suggest that promised and automatic full
immunity for rst-in applicants may be an important element of successful leniency programs.
3. Empirical Evidence on Leniency Application Delays
3.1. Data
We sample data from EC cartel decisions issued over the period 1996 to 2012. Our analysis
restricts to cartels that are eligible for leniency, i.e., cartels whose investigation ended after
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July 18, 1996| the date of the old leniency introduction.5 The EC data currently include
110 cartels investigated by the EC between July 1996 and March 2012. A rich variety of case-
specic information is recorded in the data, including the start and end dates of a cartel and
those of Commission investigation, whether rms applied for leniency and if so, the date of
the rst application in the most of the cases.6 These are the key variables of interest in this
paper. In order to isolate the eect of leniency revision from those of the other institutional
changes, we restrict our sample to cartels whose rst applications predate the publication of the
White Paper on Damage Actions (April 2, 2008) | a major innovation in the EU's anti-cartel
regime.7 One cartel is excluded due to this restriction. Furthermore, we exclude two cartels
whose investigations ended after April 2, 2008 without a rm submitting an application. As
discussed earlier, conspirators could apply throughout an investigation. Therefore, the White
Paper might have aected application decisions in these cartels. Finally, we exclude 11 cartels
because the dates of application is unknowable from publicly available data and it is impossible
to make inferences in these cases. We refer to the 96 remaining cartels as our full sample. In
78 cartels of the full sample, rms applied for leniency. The 78 cartels are referred to as our
reports sample. The main variables and model parameters are dened in Table 1.
[Table 1 about here]
The EC data suers from a lack of reliable information on producer concentration. The
variable has been shown to be an important determinant of cartel stability (Selten 1973) and
conspirators' incentive to report (Ellis and Wilson 2003). Omission of this variable could well
bias some of the estimated eects of leniency and those of other predictors in our empirical
analysis. In many published decisions, market shares of cartel participants are omitted for
condentiality. Furthermore, apart from the US and Germany, data on concentration ratios
and other summary measures of market structure are largely unavailable in ocial publications
(Lyons et al. 2001, McCloughan and Abounoori 2003). Collecting data and constructing our
own concentration ratios for each cartelized market are an enormous, if not impossible, task
5All EC cartel investigations that started before July 18, 1996 ended prior to February 19, 2002.
6Unless otherwise specied, all euro values throughout the paper are adjusted to 2010 e using standard
measure of general price trends published by the OECD on the Producer Price Indices for prices, labor costs
and interest rates of domestic manufacturing.
7The White Paper \suggests specic policy options and measures that would help giving all victims of EU
antitrust infringements access to eective redress mechanisms so that they can be fully compensated for the
harm they suered". See http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/index.html for details.
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and are beyond the scope of the present analysis. But to remedy at least in part the potential
model misspecication bias, we include the total number of participating cartelists during a
cartel's entire course to control for, among other things, dierence in producer concentration
across the cartelized markets. Given that the sampled cartels usually capture the majority, if
not all, of all the market shares, the number of cartel members may serve as a (imperfect but
reasonable) proxy for the number of market competitors. Moreover, EU-wide and worldwide
markets are likely to have more competitors than national markets; Some industry types (e.g.,
mining) are likely to feature higher concentration than others (e.g., wholesale and retail trade)
for reasons such as existence of entry and exit barriers (Mann 1966; Martin 1979). Therefore,
we include the scope of the geographic markets (as determined by the EC in its decision) and
the type of industries as additional controls for concentration.
Leniency application delays Firms may join and leave a cartel at dierent dates; Collusive
agreements sometimes start in one region then spread over many regions (Levenstein and Suslow
2011). Most of our analysis uses the ending date of the last agreement to mark a cartel's downfall
and to determine the duration of application delays. In robustness checks, we obtain similar
results using alternative denitions of ending dates: the date that the rst applicant leaves the
cartel and the date of the rst permanent exit by a conspirator.
Table 2 summarizes the principal statistics of application delay durations by leniency regime.
A spell in this context refers to a period of application delay, which begins at the later of the
cartel's end date and the date of the leniency introduction. The rst two columns of statistics
in Panel A are for all delay spells, including those ended in an investigation closure and the
expiration of the old leniency program; The next two columns are for spells that ended in a
leniency application; The nal column is for spells with positive delay durations.
[Table 2 about here]
The results are quite stunning in terms of the prevalence of application delays, as over
three-quarters of the applications by rst-in applicants postdated cartel dissolution (Row 3,
Column 4, Panel A). The prevalence of delays is particularly great for spells that ended before
the new leniency, as over 40 percent of the applications are delayed for over a year.8
The mean value of DELAY, which includes spells that ended in an investigation or the
leniency revision but not necessarily a leniency application, ranges from a low of nine months
for the new leniency regime to a high value of 20 months for the old leniency.
8The gure is not reported in the table.
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These rather impressive statistics regarding the length of application delays may understate
the importance of these concerns in the cases in which they arise. The statistics in the nal
column of Panel A, Table 2 describe the length of application delays excluding cartels where
applications predated dissolution. The mean values of DELAY s now exceed 12 months under
both leniency regimes.
Panel B of Table 2 reports the median values that correspond to the entries in panel A.
Because of the skewed distributions of the DELAY durations, the median values are below the
means in most of the instances.
Moreover, we create a series of six-month periods to track application delays. The periods
alternately begin on July 18 and February 19, so that they t the introduction of the leniency
programs on July 18, 1996 and February 19, 2002, respectively. We have observations for 17
periods in the data and we calculate the average DELAY in each period. Panel A of Figure 1
plots the mean duration of applications delays per period; Panel B plots the medians.
[Figure 1 about here]
Long application delays are prevalent under the old leniency regime: The mean values of
DELAY exceed 10 months in six out of eight periods prior to the leniency revision. After the
new leniency introduction, long delays become occasional and applications become somewhat
faster as in ve out of nine periods the mean values of DELAY fall below ve months.
Antitrust policies. A second set of variables captures aspects of the institutional environ-
ment where rms apply for leniency. LENIENCY is a dummy variable. It equals one if a spell
ends after February 19, 2002; it equals zero if a spell ends before the date. MANPOWER is the
annual number of EC DG Competition's stas. The variable is included as a proxy for changes
in the EC's investigatory intensity from year to year under the assumption that the probability
that a cartel is investigated and detected increases in the EC's investigative resources, ceteris
paribus.
MARGIN is the average dierence in ne reductions between the rst and second applicants
during the pervious year. This variable controls for changes in the marginal incentive that the
penalty regime provides rms with to come out ahead in denouncing a cartel. BecauseMARGIN
is not dened for spells that ended before July 18, 1997 or if there was no application in the
previous year, we only have 94 observations for this variable.
The EC's Fining Guidelines provide that the \basic amount of nes"| the level of nes
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in absence of osetting leniency reductions| increases with the duration of an infringement.9
Our second penalty variable, DURATION, is a cartel's life span (in months) that is proven
by documented evidence.10 The variable serves as a proxy for the scale of penalty that a
conspirator would pay if he does not confess.
Macroeconomic Fluctuations and Market Structure. The remaining two sets of vari-
ables have been similarly dened and used in earlier empirical studies of leniency's ecacy in
destabilizing and deterring cartels (Marquez 1994; Dick 1996; Suslow 2005; Zimmerman and
Connor 2005). They reect the possible variations in the market and macroeconomic environ-
ments where leniency applications take place. Some of these variables control for, at least in
part, the potential heterogeneity in dissolution probabilities across the cartels.
It is perhaps by now mother's milk to industrial economists that in a repeated-game collusion
is easier to sustain as players become more patient. The average annual interest rate with 3-
month maturity|INTEREST|is the short-term market rate of interest generally available
to borrowers. It is used as a presumptive measure of uctuations in rms' discount factor.
[Table 3 about there]
Received industrial organization theory also suggests that business cycle timing may aect
cartels' stability (e.g., Green and Porter 1984; Rotemberg and Saloner 1986; Haltiwanger and
Harrington 1991). I test for the eects of observable business cycle uctuations with two vari-
ables: [1] the real GDP growth rate ( GDP); and [2] a dummy variable| PEAK-TROUGH|
indicating whether a cartel ends in a period of peak-to-trough.
There are a number of ways that the size of cartel membership| FIRMS| could aect
or be associated with cartel stability. Besides reecting (inversely) concentration, it may also
inuence, among other things, the costs of monitoring and coordinating a cartel (e.g., Stigler
(1964), Dick (1996)). It is worth to note that the existence of some cartels with a large number
of rms is not as paradoxical as it may appear: many cartels with a large membership are
monitored and coordinated by a trade association.11
9The basic amount also does not take into account varies aggravating and mitigating circumstances such
as, among others, whether a rm was playing a leader's role and whether the rm had a limited extent of
involvement.
10We obtain similar results using suspected cartel durations.
11Levenstein and Suslow (2011) make a similar remark on the large number of cartel participation. Brenner
(2009) makes a similar remark on the role of trade association in monitoring and coordinating cartels.
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Finally, I include two categorical variables, INDUSTRY TYPE and MARKET-SCOPE, to
control for the eects of omitted cartel-specic characteristics (e.g., price transparency, market
concentration, industry-specic cyclicality, etc.) that may be correlated with both dissolution
likelihood and the included variables of interest. Table 3, Panel B of the online Appendix
reports the distribution of industry types and market scope.
4.2. Hazard model estimates of determinants of delay
The leniency application decision is analyzed most naturally in a hazard model framework. A
spell in this context refers to a period of application delay, which begins at the later of the
cartel's end date and the date of the leniency introduction. In what follows, we discuss two
alternative empirical specications and investigate the robustness of the results. The second
specication is a generalization of the rst.
 Cox's (1972) semiparametric proportional hazard model is the most popular ap-
proach towards characterizing the hazard function h(t; ). The model is exible enough to
account for potential inappropriate distribution assumptions that may be involved in paramet-
ric methods.12 The hazard function for spell i is
hi(t;xi) = h0(t) exp(x0i)
where t is the dierence (in months) between the date of the rst application and the later of the
date of cartel dissolution and the date of the leniency introduction. xi is a vector of observed
explanatory variables. The parameter vector  is the vector of coecients, measuring the inu-
ence of observed characteristics. The term exp(x0i) shifts the baseline hazard function h0(t),
and a positive coecient indicates that the observed characteristics increase the application
hazard and reduce the delay. The model is semiparametric in that the baseline hazard h0(t) is
a nonparametric function of time, with the inuence of other observable characteristics spec-
ied assuming a particular functional form. Furthermore, the model is a proportional hazard
one since the ratio of the hazard function for any group with certain observed characteristics to
that of the baseline hazard equals a constant, dependent only on the observed characteristics;
i.e, h(t)=h0(t), the relative hazard function, is not time varying.
Suppose that there are n observations and k distinct leniency application delay times. Fur-
ther suppose that we can rank the application times such that t1 < t2 < ::: < tk where tj
12The advantages of using Cox (1972) model to analyze time to event data have been widely recognized. See,
e.g., Kalbeisch and Prentice (1980), Meyer (1990), and Perperoglou (2005).
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denotes the application time for the jth spell. Furthermore, let Rj denote the set of spells have
not applied for leniency until time tj. Then the probability that the `th application will take
place at time tj given that some conspirators in set Rj will apply for leniency at time tj is
h`(tj;x`)P
2Rj h (tj;x )
=
exp(x0`)P
2Rj exp(x
0
)
(1)
Taking the product of the conditional probabilities in (1) yields the partial likelihood function
L =
Y
j
"
exp(x0j)P
2Rj exp(x
0
)
#
;
with corresponding log-likelihood function
lnL =
X
j
24x0j   lnX
2Rj
exp(x0)
35 : (2)
 Cox's competing risks model. An investigation can end in two ways: (1) with amnesty
applications prior to or during its course; or (2) without a conspirator reporting. In the latter
case, we can only infer that spell durations would have continued beyond the date that the
investigation ended, but was censored at the date. Moreover, in nine cartels that collapsed prior
to the leniency revision (February 19, 2002), one of the two situations arose: (1) applications by
rst-in applicants postdated the revision (ve cartels); or (2) the investigation ended after the
revision without a rm reporting (four cartels). For these cartels, delay spells under the 1996
Leniency Notice are censored at February 19, 2002: We can only infer that DELAY would have
continued beyond the date if the old program were not revised. Estimation of the application
hazard function from observed DELAY times must also consider the censoring of application
delays for cartels whose spells ended in an investigation closure or the leniency revision.
A popular choice towards the analysis of competition risks is using a stratied Cox model
from augmented data (Lunn and McNeil 1995). Let  denote a spell's failure type where  = 0
indicates those spells that ended in a leniency application;  = 1 indicates those spells ended
in an investigation closure;  = 2 indicates the spells ended in the leniency revision. The joint
distribution of failure times and cause of failure is considered and the hazard function of a
particular cause in the presence of all other causes is estimated. In the absence of ties (i.e.,
multiple cartel groups apply for leniency at the same tj) the full partial log-likelihood is given
by
lnL =
X
j; j=0
x0j +
2X
j=1
X
j
 
j + x
0
j
 X
j
ln
24X
2Rj
0@exp (x0) + 2X
j=1
exp
 
j + x
0

1A35 ;
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where j (with j = 1; 2) is a constant so that the baseline hazard functions for the dierent
types of risk dier by a constant ratio.
Running standard Cox regression on the augmented data set gives the appropriate estimates
of the regression coecients, provided the model t is good. The partial likelihood which results
from the method is precisely the partial likelihood suggested by Kalbeisch and Prentice (1980)
for competing risks.
 Hazard model estimates. Table 3 reports the competing risks Cox regression estimates
of the coecients. Unless otherwise stated, the coecient of interest throughout the paper is
that of the LENIENCY, the eect of the leniency revision on application delays.
Column (1) shows that the leniency revision immediately results in a hazard prole with
shorter application delays. The estimated LENIENCY coecient is positive and statistically
signicant, and corresponds to a 102 percent (expf0:705g   1  102%) increase in the appli-
cation hazard from the pre-revision level. Figure 3 depicts this relationship diagrammatically.
Columns (2) and (3) show that the impact of the new leniency is quite similar to that in (1)
with controls for changes in macroeconomic conditions (column (2)) and the eects of market
structures (column (3)). In Column (4), I add the number of the EC DG Competition's stas|
MANPOWER| as a crude measure of year-to-year changes in the likelihood that a cartel is
investigated and caught. This does not change the signicance of my results but considerably
increases the magnitude of LENIENCY 's impact: The coecient now corresponds to nearly
a triple increase (expf1:373g   1  2:95) in the application hazard. This is consistent with
the view that the rms' incentive to report critically depends on the probability of indepen-
dent antitrust investigation and apprehension (e.g., Harrington 2008; Harrington and Chang
2009). Column (5) includes all the exogenous covariates and LENIENCY. The impact of the
new leniency remains large and statistically signicant. In column (6), I add the duration
of infringement and a dummy to indicate whether the EC's surprise inspection predates the
application. Including the variables may give rise to endogeneity concerns. The main point
here is that the strong, negative and statistically insignicant impact of the new leniency on
application delays is unaected by the inclusion of these variables as additional controls in the
specication.
[Insert Table 4 Here]
[Insert Fig. 3 Here]
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 Probit model estimates. Our hazard models consider the marginal impact of antitrust
policies and economic conditions on delay in general. But of particular concern is the impact
of changes in these factors on reasonably long delays, since these are the cases that are of most
relevance for both policy-making and empirical work on cartel stability and leniency application
behavior. We therefore, in Table 4, reestimate our models as probit models of the decision to
delay application at least 12 months. As mentioned earlier, the mean of this dependent variable
is 41.9%.
Table 4 reports the probit coecients and standard errors. We expect all coecients to
switch signs, as a positive coecient in the probit indicates a higher likelihood of delay. This is
precisely what we nd. The LENIENCY coecients remain large and signicant. In particular,
the new leniency introduction leads to a 116 percent decrease in LONG-DELAY s (expf0:772g 
1  116%). Likewise, we continue to see a positive correlation between MANPOWER and
application delays (columns (10), (11) and (12)). But as in the case of the hazard models
(columns (5) and (6)), the coecients of the investigatory resource variable remain insignicant.
Thus, the probit estimates conrm the pattern of our main ndings from the hazard models.
For LENIENCY, the eects are similar in magnitude to those in the hazard models, suggesting
that the new leniency may play an important role in reducing long delays as well as in reducing
short delays. Indeed, if we reestimate these probit models with a dummy for any delay, as
opposed to a dummy for long delays, we obtain similar signicant results on LENIENCY.
5. Additional Robustness Checks
Our empirical strategy is implemented using a before-and-after comparison across groups where
the date of leniency revision| February 19, 2002| is used as an exogenous shock to identify the
impact of the revision. Our concern here is that if alternative shocks| i.e., placebo policies|
yield a better t to the data, then the link between leniency introductions and the changes
in observed cartel durations over time might not be causal.13 To investigate, we borrow the
method of Miller (2009) and re-run the regression in column (5) of Table 3 but use alternative
time breakpoints in the data and compare the maximized log-likelihoods across the dierent
specications.
Each points on the graphs of Figure 4 corresponds to the maximized log-likelihood of one
Cox regression. The point located at zero on the horizontal axes marks the maximized log-
likelihood when the shocks are imposed at the leniency revisions. The points to the left (resp.
13In a similar way, Miller (2009) motivates his robustness tests of placebo policy interventions.
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right) of zero represent the log-likelihoods when the shocks are imposed before (resp. after)
February 19, 2002. Panel A uses six-month periods. The maximized log-likelihood generated
by leniency ( 282:369) is greater than those generated by all but two placebo policy shocks.
The oending placebo policy that predates the leniency revision corresponds not to a fall but a
sharp increase in DELAY of one spell that ended in the fth period before February 19, 2002.
The oending placebo policy that postdates the revision corresponds to a dramatic increase in
DELAY of one spell that ended in the fth period following the revision. Panels B and C use
three-month and twelve-month periods, respectively. The results are largely similar to that in
the six-month case. In the twelve-month case, the regression t is globally maximal when the
shock is imposed at February 19, 2002.
[Insert Fig. 4 Here]
6. Conclusion
The social costs of cartel have motivated an extensive literature investigating the ecacy and
design of anti-cartel policies. While there is a large literature on leniency application decisions,
we are not aware of any previous analysis of delays in applications.
We nd a high prevalence of delay in leniency application empirically that is so far over-
looked by the theoretical models. Our hazard and probit modeling suggest that delays are
systematically correlated with the severity of punishment and business cycles. In particular,
we nd support for the hypothesis that delays tend to be shorter after the new leniency intro-
duction. But we did not nd support for the hypothesis that the introduction of the EC's new
leniency shortens delay. Our research has implications for the large literature on collusion, in
particular the impacts of leniency on cartel stability and market eciency.
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Table 1. Terms and Definitions
Denition
Cartel An agreement or a series of agreements between competing rms or associations of rms
that constitutes a single infringement, according to the EC, of Art. 101 (formerly
Art. 81 and Art. 85) of the EC treaty.
END DATE Ending date of the last agreement(s) between any two (or more) cartel participants.
END DATE -2 The date that the rst applicant leaves the cartel.
END DATE -3 The date of the rst permanent departure from the cartel by a participant.
Dependent Variables
DELAY (resp. DE-
LAY -2, DELAY -3)
0 if the rst application predates END DATE (resp. END DATE -2, END DATE -3);
If the rst application postdates END DATE (resp. END DATE -2, END DATE -3),
the dierence (in months) between the date of the rst application and the later of
END DATE (resp. END DATE -2, END DATE -3) and the initiation date of the
leniency (under the terms of which the application is made);
If a cartel collapsed before February 19, 2002 and one of the two following situations
arises: (1) the rst application postdated February 19, 2002 ; or (2) the investigations
ended after February 19, 2002 with conspirators applying for amnesty, we distinguish
DELAY (resp. DELAY -2, DELAY -3) under the new policy (as dened above)
from (censored) DELAY (resp. DELAY -2, DELAY -3) under the old leniency. We
measure the latter as the months elapsed from END DATE (resp. END DATE -2,
END DATE -3) to February 18, 2002.
If rms did not apply for amnesty, the dierence (in months) between the date that
the EC issues its prohibition decision and the later of the cartel's END DATE (resp.
END DATE -2, END DATE -3) and the date of the leniency introduction.
LONG-DELAY 1 if DELAY is longer than one year; 0 otherwise.
Independent Variables
Antitrust Policies
LENIENCY Dummy variable = 1 if a spell ends after February 19, 2002 = 0 prior to the date.
MANPOWER The annual number of EC DG Competition's stas.
DURATION A cartel's duration (months) that is proven by documented evidence.
INSPECTION Dummy variable = 1 if the Commission's surprise inspection predates the rst appli-
cation = 0 otherwise.
MARGIN The dierence in percentage ne reductions between the rst and second applicants.
Macroeconomic Fluctuations, Firm Impatience and Industry Concentration
PEAK-TROUGH 1 if a spell ends in a peak-to-trough period of a business cycle; 0 otherwise. If the
relevant geographic market consisted of multiple economic areas in multiple count-
(continued overleaf )
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Table 1. (Continued)
Denition
ries, it is the weighted average of the indicators. The weight applied is the annual
national GDP.
 GDP Semi-annual growth rate of the real domestic product of the relevant geographic mar-
ket (according to the EC). If the relevant geographic market consisted of multiple
economic areas in multiple countries, it is the weighted average of the rates. The
weight applied is the semi-annual national GDP.
INTEREST Annual average (real) short-term interest rates, 3-month maturity. If the relevant
geographic market consisted of multiple economic areas in multiple countries, it is
the weighted average of the rates. The weight applied is the annual national GDP.
INDUSTRY TYPE Categorical variable indicating the type of industry where a cartel operates. The indus-
try types are wholesale and retail trade; food, feed, tobacco and other agricultural
products; chemicals; transport; primary material; machinery, equipment and metal
products; and other products and services.
MARKET-SCOPE Categorical variable indicating the geographic scope of cartelized market. The scopes
are national, multinational (but less than EU-wide), EEA-wide or EU-wide, and
worldwide.
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Panel A: Mean Application Delays
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Figure 1. Average Application Delay Duration per Six-Month Period
Notes: The sample of spells runs from July 1996 to October 2007. The vertical bars mark the introduction of the new leniency
program on February 19, 2002. Panel A plots the semi-annual means of leniency application delays starting from the later of the
ending date of a cartel's last agreement and the date of the leniency introduction; Panel B plots the medians. The source for these
values is authors' calculations based on 96 EC cartel decisions issued over the period 1996-2012.
Gartner and Zhou Delays in Leniency Application 19
Panel A: Average Fine Reductions
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Panel B: Average Marginal Fine Reductions
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
M
ea
n 
M
ar
gi
na
l F
in
e 
Re
du
ct
io
ns
 (%
)
1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008
Year of the First Applications
Figure 2. Average Fine Reductions and Average Marginal Fine
Reductions per Six-Month Period
Notes: The sample of leniency applications runs from July 1996 to January 2007. Panel A plots the semi-annual means of
ne reductions for the rst and second applicants, respectively. Panel B plots the semi-annual means of the dierences in ne
reductions between the rst and second applicants (i.e., the marginal ne reductions). The vertical bars mark the introduction
of the new leniency program on February 19, 2002. The source for these values is authors' calculations based on 78 cartels with
leniency applications that were prosecuted by the EC over the period 1996-2012.
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Figure 3. The Impact of The EC's New Leniency
Notes: The solid line corresponds to delay spells under the EC's 2002 Leniency Notice. The dashed line corresponds to delay spells
under the EC's 1996 Leniency Notice. The source for these values is authors' calculations based on 96 EC cartel decisions issued
over the period 1996-2012.
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Appendix
Table 2. Distribution of The Duration of Leniency Application Delays [in months]
Panel A: Means (Standard Deviations) and Fractions of Spells with Positive DELAY s
Spells with
Full Sample Reports Sample Positive DELAYs
Fraction of Fraction of
Spells with Spells with
Positive Positive
Leniency Program Mean (Std. Dev.) DELAY s Mean (Std. Dev.) DELAY s Mean (Std. Dev.)
EC's 1996 Leniency 20 (21) 0.81 17 (20) 0.80 22 (20)
EC's 2002 Leniency 9 (13) 0.76 9 (14) 0.73 12 (15)
Both programs 16 (19) 0.79 14 (18) 0.77 18 (19)
Observations 105 78 83
Panel B: Medians
Spells with
Leniency Program Full Sample Reports Sample Positive DELAYs
EC's 1996 Leniency 20 9 14
EC's 2002 Leniency 4 3 5
Both programs 7 6 10
Observations 105 78 83
Source.{ Authors' calculations based on 96 cartel decisions by the European Commission and judgments of the Court of
First Instance and the European Court of Justice for the period 1996-2012.
Note.{ An \observation" corresponds to a spell which is a period of application delays starting from the later of the ending
date of a cartel's last agreement and the date of the leniency introduction.
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Table 3. Descriptive Statistics:Antitrust Policies, Market and Macroeconomic Conditions
EC's 1996 EC's 2002
Leniency Program Leniency Program Both Programs
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Antitrust Policies
LENIENCY (1=yes) 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.39 0.49
MANPOWER 450.97 45.36 578.15 41.72 500.63 76.17
INSPECTION (1=yes) 0.67 0.47 0.49 0.51 0.6 0.49
DURATION (month) 82.98 67.76 106.47 99.57 92.15 82.02
Macroeconomic Conditions
 GDP (%) 2.82 1.22 1.97 0.92 2.49 1.18
PEAK-TROUGH (1=yes) 0.49 0.55 0.30 0.43 0.42 0.51
INTEREST (%) 3.73 1.35 2.60 0.72 3.29 1.27
Market Conditions
FIRMS 6.38 4.99 278.49 1716.43 112.63 1072.81
N % N % N %
Market Conditions
INDUSTRY TYPE
Wholesale & retail trade 3 4.69 3 7.32 6 5.71
Food, feed, tobacco & other agr. products 6 9.38 2 4.88 8 7.62
Primary material 4 6.25 8 19.51 12 11.43
Chemicals 25 39.06 8 19.51 33 31.43
Machinery, equipment& metal products 11 17.19 11 26.83 22 20.95
Transport 6 9.38 1 2.44 7 6.67
Other products & services 9 14.06 8 19.51 17 16.19
MARKET SCOPE
National 14 21.88 15 36.59 29 27.62
Multinational 6 9.38 3 7.32 9 8.57
EU-wide or EEA-wide 16 25.00 15 36.59 31 29.52
Worldwide 28 43.75 8 19.51 36 34.29
Observations 64 41 105
Source.{ Authors' calculations based on the decisions on 96 cartels by the European Commission and judgments of the
Court of First Instance and the European Court of Justice for the period 1996-2012.
Note.{ All euro values are in 2005 e . An \observation" corresponds to a spell which is a period of application delays
starting from the later of the ending date of a cartel's last agreement and the date of the leniency introduction.
a.{ For MARGIN, we have 49 observation for spells ended before February 19, 2002 and 34 observations for spells ended
after February 19, 2002.
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Table 3. Cox Proportional Hazard Model Estimates of Leniency Application Delays
Log(DELAY+1)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Leniency program dummy
LENIENCY 0:705 0:971 0:710 1:373 1:185 1:238
(0:219) (0:286) (0:268) (0:469) (0:538) (0:530)
Control variables
Log( GDP) 0:168 0:098 0:538
(0:304) (0:328) (0:448)
Log(PEAK-TROUGH+1)  0:104 0:144 0:498
(0:481) (0:551) (0:641)
Log(INTEREST ) 0:721 0:912 0:520
(0:460) (0:657) (0:646)
Log(FIRMS) 0:047 0:032  0:136
(0:136) (0:139) (0:149)
Industry xed eects yes yes no
Market scope no no no
Log(MANPOWER)  2:431  0:183  0:668
(1:438) (1:568) (1:569)
Log(DURATION ) 0:587
(0:155)
INSPECTION  1:378
(0:351)
Number of Observations 105 105 105 105 105 105
Number of failures 78 78 78 78 78 78
Time at risk 215.578 215.578 215.578 215.578 215.578 215.578
Log-pseudo likelihood -292.564 -290.819 -284.112 -291.084 -282.369 -266.703
Note.{ The table reports competing risks Cox-proportional hazard model estimates. Standard errors are robust to
heteroskedasticity and are shown in parentheses. Omitted LENIENCY category is \the EC's 1996 Leniency". Omitted
industry category is \wholesale and retail trade". Omitted market scope category is \national market". The source for
these values is authors' calculations based on the decisions on 96 cartels by the European Commission and judgments
of the Court of First Instance and the European Court of Justice for the period 1996-2012.
*** Signicant at the 1 percent level.
** Signicant at the 5 percent level.
* Signicant at the 10 percent level.
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Table 4. Probit Model Estimates of Long Leniency Application Delays
LONG-DELAY
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Leniency program dummy
LENIENCY  0:772  1:158  0:741  1:351  1:810  1:934
(0:266) (0:333) (0:289) (0:436) (0:504) (0:542)
Control variables
Log( GDP)  0:120  0:210  0:433
(0:246) (0:317) (0:321)
Log(PEAK-TROUGH+1) 0:059  0:023  0:170
(0:531) (0:680) (0:684)
Log(INTEREST )  0:923  1:640  1:539
(0:472) (0:585) (0:609)
Log(FIRMS)  0:183  0:235  0:018
(0:164) (0:201) (0:146)
Industry xed eects no no no
Market scope no yes yes
Log(MANPOWER) 2:243 0:927 1:431
(1:398) (1:942) (1:954)
Log(DURATION )  0:426
(0:160)
INSPECTION 1:021
(0:354)
Constant 0:078 1:344 0:688  13:618  2:758  6:539
(0:158) (0:585) (0:638) (8:538) (12:269) (12:415)
Number of Observations 105 105 105 105 105 105
Pseudo-R2 0.061 0.091 0.122 0.078 0.192 0.298
Log-pseudo likelihood -67.013 -64.921 -62.679 -65.841 -57.671 -50.118
Note.{ The table reports probit model estimates. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and are shown in
parentheses. Omitted LENIENCY category is \the EC's 1996 Leniency". Omitted industry category is \wholesale and
retail trade". Omitted market scope category is \national market". The source for these values is authors' calculations
based on the decisions on 96 cartels by the European Commission and judgments of the Court of First Instance and the
European Court of Justice for the period 1996-2012.
*** Signicant at the 1 percent level.
** Signicant at the 5 percent level.
* Signicant at the 10 percent level.
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Panel A: Six-month periods
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Panel B: Three-month periods
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Panel C: Twelve-month periods
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Figure 4. The EC's 2002 Leniency Program versus Placebo Interventions
Notes: Each point represents the maximized-likelihood of a Cox regression. The points located at zero on the horizontal axes
correspond to the introduction of the EC's 2002 Leniency. The points to the left (resp. right) of zero correspond to placebo policies
that predate (resp. postdate) the introduction of the EC's 2002 Leniency.
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